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Charter schools have become one of the most controversial issues in education
today. While proponents argue that charters will provide innovative education to
students and will spur traditional public schools to improve through competitive
pressures, opponents argue that charters drain the public school system of funding
leaving those who cannot enter the charters worse o.1 Despite this controversy,
since 1997 the number of charter schools in the US has increased more than vefold,
and the number of students has more than doubled since 1999. Today, over a
million students attend charter schools. In some states, the charter population is
a substantial portion of the total student population. For example, ten percent of
students in Arizona attend charter schools.2
Charter schools are public schools that are given autonomy from local school
districts and are subject to fewer regulations than regular public schools. Generally,
enrollment in charters is voluntary and public schools lose some funding if a student
leaves for a charter. Proponents of charters have argued that this threat of losing
students should induce public schools to improve student outcomes. However it is
theoretically unclear whether this is true and only a handful of papers have looked
at the empirical evidence of how charter schools aect students in traditional public
schools using individual data (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen 2008, Bifulco
and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006). In this paper I address this question using data from a
large urban school district in the southwest (LUSD-SW) to look at charter impacts
on test scores and student behavior.
While this paper will look at the reduced form impacts of charter schools on
traditional public schools (TPS), it is useful to think about what mechanisms may
be at play. The most commonly cited is a competition eect. When a charter school
enrolls a student they usually receive money from the chartering authority. Some
portion of this funding usually would have gone to the local public school had the
student not left for the charter. Thus there is a nancial incentive for public schools to
prevent students from attending charter schools.3 In addition, in the long-run a school
1Throughout this paper the term \traditional" public schools refers to any public non-charter
school.
2Author's calculation from data provided by Center for Education Reform and National Center
for Education Statistics, US Department of Education.
3In the state where LUSD-SW is located, the school district loses state aid for the student.
While the amount lost depends on the type of student, i.e. whether the student is economically
disadvantaged, special education, gifted, etc., the marginal student from LUSD who is not in a
special category would cost the school district $2843 in 2005, or 46% of per-student expenditures.
In 2002 losing a marginal student would have cost $4580 or 67% of per-student expenditures.
1may lose enough students to the charters so that it is forced to shut-down due to low
enrollment. If these two incentives spur public school teachers and administrators
to increase eort and eciency, then charters would generate a positive competition
eect on public schools. On the other hand, if charters are pulling too many students
from one school, districts may \give-up" and reallocate funding towards other schools.
In addition, some theoretical work by Cardon (2003)?cardon2003sqc) suggests that
if there are capacity constraints on charters then public schools may not respond to
charter competition. Indeed, if public schools are overcrowded, they may welcome
the charter schools, since they would serve as a release valve.
Even without an explicit response from the school district, charters can impact
traditional public schools. For example, if charters pull enough students out of a
public school, the principal may have to reduce faculty and sta. While this may
be good in the long-run, in the short-term it could reduce morale while generating
confusion and uncertainty. In addition, new charter schools or expansions in existing
schools may be disruptive by drawing away a large number of students at once, forcing
the local public schools to cope with a sudden drop in funding by cutting costs. Over
the long-term the schools will likely adapt, but in the short-run only certain costs
may be able to be cut such as teacher and sta hiring, after school programs, or
additional instruction. Charters may also attract better teachers from regular public
schools, leaving worse teachers behind. Another possibility is that if charters attract
only certain types of students, then the characteristics of the peers for students who
remain in traditional public schools may change. Thus charters can induce impacts
on student outcomes through peer-eects.
Even if we are to abstract away from the mechanism of charter impacts on tra-
ditional public schools, identifying the eects of charter schools on TPS students is
problematic because neither a student's choice of what school to attend nor a charter
school's choice of where to locate are random. Thus, any study of charter school im-
pacts on non-charter students must account for these two potential types of selection
bias. Previous work has used student xed-eects to account for endogenous move-
ments of students and school xed-eects to account for charter location (Booker et
al. 2008, Buddin and Zimmer 2005, Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006).4 However, we
may be concerned that panel data methods are insucient for eliminating bias in the
charter competition context. In particular, while student xed-eects may be a su-
cient correction student selection, selection of charter locations could be based o of
4Booker et. al. (2008) also make use of student-spell xed eects so that their estimates are
identied o of changes in charter penetration while a student is enrolled at a specic school.
2local trends in public school quality and thus school-xed eects will not completely
address the bias.
Thus, in this paper, I use an alternative technique to addressing endogenous char-
ter location than the prior literature by using characteristics of the building stock
near traditional public schools as instruments for charter location. The intuition be-
hind this is that when a charter is started, one of the most restrictive constraints is
nding space available for rent.5 In particular, I use the number of properties near
a traditional public school with between 20,000 and 50,000 square feet of building
space and the number of properties that host shopping centers, which charters in
LUSD commonly locate in. I argue that these supply constraints on new charters are
plausibly exogenous sources of variation in charter location.
In addition, I also add to the previous literature by looking at discipline and atten-
dance of TPS students in addition to test scores. Based on ndings from Heckman,
Stixrud and Urzua (2006) that non-cognitive skills are correlated with poor behavior,
Imberman (2008) argues that the combination of student discipline and attendance
provides a proxy for non-cognitive skills. Using this strategy, he nds that charter
schools in LUSD are more eective at improving non-cognitive skills of students but
not cognitive skills. Thus it seems reasonable that public schools could respond by fo-
cusing on student safety and discipline to encourage students to stay in public schools.
This may be particularly important since Weiher and Tedin (2002) nd that discipline
and safety are drive many parents' decisions to enroll their children in charters.
Regressions using school xed eects show a somewhat positive impact of charter
schools on TPS test scores which is consistent with much of the previous literature.
However, IV estimates show negative and statistically signicant impacts on math
and language test score gains. There is no statistically signicant impact on reading
gains. These results suggest that analyses which rely on school xed eects to address
endogenous location of charter schools may suer from bias. They also imply that,
in the short-term, charter schools can be detrimental to the academic performance
of non-charter students. Nonetheless, I do nd a silver lining in the results. Charter
schools appear to induce signicant drops in disciplinary infractions in non-charter
students. However, since I do not nd a corresponding improvement in attendance,
I cannot establish whether this is truly an improvement in non-cognitive skills or
changes in enforcement.
5While some charters purchase land, since relatively little start-up capital is provided by public
sources, most charters in LUSD-SW rent their space or use donated space
32 Background
Previous Literature
A substantial amount of research has looked at how charter schools aect student
outcomes (Hoxby and Murarka 2008, Imberman 2008, Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg
and Jansen 2007, Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin and Branch 2007, Bifulco and Ladd 2006,
Sass 2006, Hoxby and Rocko 2004, Zimmer and Buddin 2003). While the estimates
of how charter schools aect test scores have been mixed, Imberman (2008) provides
evidence of improvements in student discipline and attendance in certain types of
charter schools. On the other hand only a handful of papers have considered how
charter schools aect non-charter students. Some early work on the topic has used
school level data to answer this question. Bettinger (2005) nds little eect of
charter schools on public schools while Hoxby (2004) and Holmes, Desimone and
Rupp (2003) nd positive eects of charter schools on public schools. While these
papers were instrumental in starting this line of literature, since all outcome measures
are aggregated to the school level it is impossible to tell whether these results are due
to charter competition or changes in the student body composition.
Recent work on whether charter schools aect non-charter students have turned
to individual panel data in order to address concerns regarding changes in composi-
tion. In addition, panel data can be used to account for unobserved heterogeneity of
students across dierent levels of charter penetration, as long as the selection of stu-
dents into schools near or far from charters is based on time-invariant characteristics.
Sass (2006) and Booker, et. al. (2008) nd that charter schools have positive impacts
on traditional public schools while Bifulco and Ladd (2006) and Buddin and Zimmer
(2005) nd statistically insignicant impact estimates. Thus, in general, researchers
have found that charter schools have, at worst, no signicant eect on achievement
in non-charter public schools and, at best, a large positive eect.
3 Charter Schools in LUSD
LUSD-SW was one of the rst school districts in the US to face competition from
charter schools. Both district and state authorized schools began appearing in 1996.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of charter openings in LUSD's county over time. Each of
these types of schools experienced substantial growth over the time period studied in
this paper. In 2004-05 this growth culminated in 99 charter schools of which 73 schools
were chartered by the state or a university while 26 were chartered by LUSD-SW
4directly.6 Charter schools account for a large portion of student enrollment in LUSD.
Enrollment in district charters in 2004-05 is equal to 6% of non-charter enrollment and
state charters have enrollment equivalent to 9% of non-charter enrollment in LUSD.
Figure 2 shows how the average share of students within 1.5 miles in overlapping
grades who are in charter schools changes over time. The growth matches closely
to the growth in the number of charter schools up to 2002 when growth in charter
share slows. Nonetheless, both of these gures show that traditional public schools
experienced considerable increases in their exposure to charter schools over the years
covered in this study.
While it may be interesting to dierentiate between the eects of district and state
charters, unfortunately my instrument is too weak for district charters.7 Nonetheless,
the most substantial competition is likely to come from the state charters since LUSD-
SW loses state aid when a student leaves for these charters but not for district charters.
In addition, the local school district cannot control where state charters locate, which
is important for competitive pressures to be eective.
Table 1 provides summary information on traditional public schools and state
charters for the years 1998 - 2004, as prior to 1998 there were very few charters
in LUSD. The rst column in each grade-level includes all non-charter schools in
LUSD-SW. Charter students dier substantially from non-charter students. Charter
students are generally wealthier and are less likely to have special needs, as shown
by the lower rates of limited English prociency, special education, and gifted & tal-
ented. Charters also attract disproportionately fewer African-Americans and more
Hispanics. The white population of charters, while slightly lower, does not statisti-
cally signicantly dier from non-charter schools. However, despite the higher wealth
status of charter students, their test score performance is lower than non-charter stu-
dents. Thus, these results suggest that charter students tend to be low-performers
who do not have special needs.
6Only two schools have university charters. Since they are independent of LUSD, I include them
in the \state charter" category.
7This is mainly due to two reasons. The rst is that some district charters are conversions which
were previously regular public schools and thus do not need to search for alternative locations. The
second is that, after removing the conversion charters, the number of district charters remaining is
17, leaving little variation across regular public schools.
54 Data
In this paper I utilize administrative records from a large urban school district int
the southwest. This dataset includes information on disciplinary infractions warrant-
ing an in-school suspension or harsher punishment, attendance, rates scores from the
Stanford Achievement Test versions 9 and 10, a criterion-referenced state examina-
tion, grades, course work, and a number of student characteristics. A full accounting
of the variables used in this paper with denitions can be found in Appendix Table
1. The data cover the 1993-1994 to 2004-2005 academic years and I am able to fol-
low individual students for as long as they attend school in LUSD, providing a long
time-series on many students. After dropping students in pre-school or kindergarten,
with missing data, or in charter schools, 55% of students who are rst observed in
the data prior to ninth grade have at least four observations.
Since not all students take the Stanford Achievement Test, which is a norm-
referenced examination, and test data are only available starting in 1998, I generate
two samples.8 I call the rst sample the \behavior sample." This sample is used
when analyzing discipline & attendance. It includes students in grades 1-12 who
were enrolled as of the end of October of each year, since this is when demographic
information is collected by the district. The demographic les identify the school
a student attends and thus I use this as the student's school for the year. Some
observations (< 0:1%) are excluded due to missing attendance data.
I call the second sample the \test sample," which includes all students in the
behavior sample from 1999-2004 who have scores recorded for the mathematics, read-
ing, and language portions of the Stanford 9/10 examination in both the current and
previous years so that I can generate test-score gains. If any one of these tests are
missing I drop the observation so that all three test scores are analyzed using the
same sample. Stanford 9/10 was given to all English-speaking students in grades
1-8 and all students in grades 9-11. This provides wider coverage of grades than
previous work on charter schools, since most districts and states do not start testing
until third grade and often stop testing by eighth grade. Students who were not
procient enough in English in grades 1-8 took the Spanish language Aprenda exam.9
8Norm-referenced examinations are tests which are scaled to match a representative sample of
students in the same grade. Some papers use criterion-referenced examinations instead, which are
exams where the student's grade is based on a set of absolute standards.
9 Twenty-four percent of elementary student-year observations in the base sample have no test
score because they take the Spanish language exam, but by the time students reach middle school,
almost all are taking the English language exam. In high school, 23% of student-years in the base
sample are missing test scores. This is mostly due to students dropping out of school or moving
6While I have data on these exam results, the scores are not directly comparable to
those of students taking the English exam.10. After creating both samples, I drop
any students enrolled in district charter schools so that the focus of the study is how
the state charter schools aect the traditional public schools. This leaves 2,049,076
student-year observations in the base sample and 583,091 student-year observations
in the test sample.
School addresses were identied from the US Department of Education's Com-
mon Core of Data. Any missing addresses were lled in using school directories
acquired directly from LUSD-SW. These addresses were then converted to latitude
and longitude using the geocoder.us website. If an address could not be matched
using geocoder.us then I used Google EarthTM to nd the latitude and longitude.11
Afterwards, distances between schools were derived using the sphdist command in
StataTM. Data on local building stock comes from LUSD-SW's county tax appraisal
district. Schools were matched to plots with the appropriately sized buildings using
ArcGISTM. Economic characteristics of census tracts were obtained from the 2000
Census Summary Files.
Tables 2A and 2B provide summary statistics from 1998 - 2004 for schools that are
between the 0yh and 64th, 65th and 74th, 75th and 89th, and 90th and 99th percentiles of
charter penetration within 1.5 miles, which is the distance I use to calculate charter
penetration. Charter penetration is dened the fraction of students in schools within
1.5 miles and in grades covered by the observed school who attend state charters.
A more detailed description of how this variable is constructed and an explanation
for why I choose a distance metric of 1.5 miles is provided in the empirical strategy
section below. Schools with charters nearby tend to more students who are free-lunch
eligible, at-risk, LEP, and immigrants. In terms of student outcomes, schools with
charters nearby dier little from schools without charters nearby.
out of the district between October and the testing period in late winter. Some students also are
missing test scores due to illness or suspension during the testing period.
10Unfortunately, regressions looking at Aprenda scores only provided estimates that were too
imprecise to draw any conclusions. Estimates of the main model that include Aprenda scores when
Stanford 9/10 are missing along with dummies for year interacted with whether the student took
the Aprenda test provide qualitatively similar results.
11For a small number of schools addresses could not be matched to a location. Students in these
schools were dropped from the analysis.
75 Empirical Strategy
Endogenous Student Movements and Charter Location
Estimates of the impacts of charter schools non traditional public schools are
potentially biased by two types of selection. First, a parent's choice of school is
not random. Thus we may be concerned that parents would select into or out of
schools near charters for unobservable reasons that are correlated with student ability
and behavior. Perhaps more importantly, it is likely that some parents respond to
observed changes in traditional public schools that result from charter competition.
For example, suppose charters do generate positive competition eects in non-charter
schools. Some parents with high achieving students who planned to send their
children to magnet or private schools may now decide to keep their children in their
newly improved neighborhood school, thus increasing the estimated charter impact.
To address this problem I follow the previous literature by incorporating student
xed-eects into the regressions. This will suciently correct for student selection if
the selection is based on time-invariant characteristics of the students, such as their
parents' motivation.
Second, the location of charter schools is non-random. Charter location may
be aected by space availability, transportation options, economic conditions, and
the quality of nearby public schools. This is not a problem if these factors are
uncorrelated with student and traditional public school characteristics. However
there may be higher demand for alternative schooling options in areas with low-
performing schools. Indeed, many charters are created through grass roots organizing
in a community, often in response to the poor quality of the local schools.
Depending on the nature of this selection, the bias in the charter impact estimates
could be positive or negative. If charters locate near low-performing schools based
on time-invariant characteristics of the public schools (i.e. the charters locate near
schools which have been low performing for many years and have shown little improve-
ment or worsening), then simple OLS regressions would underestimate the eects of
charters. Researchers have addressed this type of selection by including school xed-
eects in OLS regressions along with student xed-eects. However, if location is,
at least partially, based on time-variant characteristics of non-charter schools then
this strategy will not eliminate, and in fact may exacerbate, the bias. One possible
way this can occur is if charters locate in areas where performance is worsening on
the belief that this will generate higher demand in the future. Since many charters
face high startup costs and thus open with few students and expand later, having
8an anticipated increase in demand could be desirable. Another mechanism for this
selection would be if parents and community leaders start charter schools when they
see performance in the public schools worsening. The direction of this type of bias
depends on whether the school's counterfactual outcome trajectory.
Figures 3A and 3B provide stylized examples of how estimated and actual char-
ter impacts may dier under two scenarios when using school xed eects. For this
example, I assume that charter impacts are positive, the mean outcomes for schools
with no charter exposure are constant at 0, and a single charter school opens nearby
at time t. In this case, charter impacts are estimated by taking the dierence be-
tween mean outcomes after t and mean outcomes before t. The true impact would
be the dierence between the mean outcome after the charter opens and the mean
outcome had a charter not opened nearby. In gure 3A we see that for a trend that
exhibits mean-reversion, and is thus temporary, the estimated charter impact tends
to underestimate the true impact. Figure 3B shows that if the trend would have
continued after the charter opens, then by ignoring the trend, school-FE regressions
would under-estimate the charter impacts even further.
To address this issue, I use an instrumental variables approach. I argue that
characteristics of the pre-existing stock of buildings, in particular the size of building
space on nearby properties and the location of both large and small shopping centers,
are plausibly exogenous instruments for charter penetration near traditional public
schools. I discuss these instruments in more detail below. The fact that my IV
results dier considerably from xed-eects results, suggest that analyses utilizing
school xed-eects may not remove all bias.
Baseline Model
We begin with an equation of the form
(1) yijt =  + C
d
jt + Xijt
 + Git + ijt
where yijt is an outcome measure for student i in school j during academic year t,
Cd is the a measure of charter penetration for state charters within a radius d of the
regular public school j, X is a set of observable student characteristics, Git is a set of
grade-by-year indicators, and  is an error term.
I follow Booker, et. al. (2008) and Sass(2006) in using a restricted value-added
model to identify test score eects where outcomes are measured as annual gains in
9standard deviations of test scores.12 For discipline and attendance, a levels model is
more intuitively appealing and thus I use that framework.
 can further be broken down into student and school error components
(2) ijt = 
ijt + jt:
The concern is that both 
ijt and jt will be correlated with Cd
jt through some unob-
served factors.
Student Selection Into Schools
One problem we face is the potential that cov(
ijt;Cd
jt) 6= 0, i.e. that something
unobservable is driving student selection into schools facing more or less charter com-
petition. The most obvious type of selection is that only certain types of students
may leave non-charters for charter schools. As was shown in Table 1, students who
attend charter schools appear to dier considerably from LUSD-SW traditional public
school students. Thus the loss of these students from schools with a large amount of
charter penetration could bias the results. Another type of selection is that students
may remain in LUSD-SW but change schools in response to charter competition.
I use a student-xed eects strategy to address this problem as in Booker et al.
(2008), Bifulco and Ladd (2006), and Sass (2006). More precisely, I assume that
(3) 
ijt = i + ijt
where cov(i;Cd
jt) 6= 0 but cov(ijt;Cd
jt) = 0. Under this assumption we can remove
 from (1) by demeaning the model with respect to the individual as such
(4) ~ yijt = ~  +  ~ C
d
jt + ~ Xijt
 + ~ Git + ~ ijt + ~ jt:
where ~ B = Bijgt    Bi +  B.13
Endogenous Charter School Location
While student xed-eects correct for student selection under the assumption
stated above, if charter location is endogenous then cov(~ jt; ~ Cd
jt) 6= 0. One way to
12Sass also uses an unrestricted model that has lagged test scores as an explanatory variable. How-
ever, this model relies on the strong assumption that twice-lagged test scores are valid instruments
for once lagged test scores. Since this is unlikely to be true, I do not use that empirical strategy.
13This is the equivalent of the method used by the \xtreg, fe" command in StataTM.
10address this type of selection is to use school xed-eects as in Bifulco and Ladd
(2006), and Sass (2006)). For this strategy to be valid it must be that
(5) ~ jt = ~ j + ~ jt
where cov(~ j; ~ Cd
jt) 6= 0 and cov(~ jt; ~ Cd
jt) = 0. Under this assumption we can add school
indicator dummies to the regression which will eliminate ~ j. Thus, our regression
equation becomes
(6) ~ yigjt =  ~ C
d
jt + ~ Xijt
 + ~ Git + ~ Sjt  + ~ ijt + ~ jt:
where S is the vector of school indicators. However, if charters select locations based
on trends in local school performance, or, similarly, if grass root eorts to create
charters are spurred by trends in local schooling conditions, then equation (5) will be
incorrect and including school indicators will not correct for selection. One possible
solution to this problem is to use an instrumental variables strategy.
I propose using characteristics of building stock near non-charter public schools
as an instrument for charter share. The idea behind this instrument is that certain
types of buildings are better suited for a school then others. Often charters need to
rent space or use donated space because they do not have funds available to build
their own buildings. In particular, charters in LUSD often locate in shopping centers
because they have a lot of space available, can be easily renovated to accommodate
building classrooms, and are easy to rent. These shopping centers range in size from
small strips of ve units to large multi-unit commercial and retail complexes. In fact
16% of state charters in LUSD borders are located in current or former shopping
centers.14 In addition charter schools are more likely to locate on plots of land with
appropriate amounts building space. If the building space is too small, then the
charter will not have enough room to operate. If it is too large, then much of the
space goes unused and the charter is unlikely to be willing to pay the rent premium.
In addition, properties with particularly large amounts of building space are often
hi-rise oce buildings, warehouses and apartment complexes, properties that are ill-
suited for charter schools. Also, since charter schools tend to rent or use donated
space as little funding is available to build new structures, the availability of existing
building space is particularly important. Since these characteristics are unlikely to
14Schools' 2008 addresses were matched, when possible, to property records available from 1995-
2001. If schools could not be matched then a visual inspection was done using Google Street
ViewTM. One charter in LUSD's boundaries could not be matched via property records or visually
to a building type.
11be correlated with other factors that could in
uence student outcomes, I argue that
they serve as plausibly exogenous instruments for charter share. I will also provide
evidence that the results are robust to tests of instrument validity.
My data on building supply comes from the county tax appraisal oce and is based
on their 1995 tax records. I use the year 1995 to address the concern that building
supply could be correlated with local economic trends. Since 1995 is prior to the
opening of charters in LUSD-SW, I avoid concurrent changes in building supply and
charter share as local economic conditions vary over time. For the buildings space
variable, I use properties with between 20,000 and 50,000 square feet of building
space as this closely corresponds to the 25th to 75th percentile of building space
for charter schools whose current address I could match to property records.15 The
average building space for properties housing charters is 52,745 s.f. and the median is
32,942 s.f. My second instrument is the number of shopping centers within a specied
distance radius.1617 One concern regarding these instruments is that they are time-
invariant and pre-existing and thus may only provide local average treatment eects
for early charters for which they will have a stronger eect. To address this, I interact
both of the instruments with the average charter share across LUSD in each year,
thus ensuring that the instruments increase as overall charter penetration increases.18
The rst and second stages of the baseline 2SLS model can hence be expressed as
(7) ~ C
d
jt = 1 g Buildings
d
jt + 2 g ShoppingCenters
d
jt + ~ Xijt
 + ~ Git + ~ ijt:
(8) ~ yijt = b e C
d
jt + ~ Xijt
 + ~ Git + ~ ijt:
where g Buildings
d
jt and g ShoppingCenters
d
jt are the instruments described above in-
15The 25th percentile is 18,626 square feet and the 75th percentile is 49,450 square feet
16 I use the number of properties rather than percentage since the each available property will
increase the options available to a new charter and thus increase the likelihood that they will locate
near the public school. A percentage measure does not capture this increase in probability as well as
a count measure. Nonetheless, I conducted regressions dividing the instrument by total commercial
properties within 1.5 miles in order to generate a percentage based measure of building stock and
found qualitatively similar results.
17LUSD has the unique characteristic that it is located in a city with few zoning restrictions. Thus
commercial and residential areas are often integrated and thus there are is considerable variation
in the instruments across schools. For the 272 traditional public schools in operation in 2004 the
average number of properties within 1.5 miles with 20,000 to 50,000 s.f. of building space is 64.5
with a 10th percentile of 16, median of 58, and a 90th percentile of 127. For shopping centers the
average is 21.2 with a 10th percentile of 5, median of 16, and a 90th percentile of 46.
18Average charter share is an unweighted average at the school level. Before interacting I normalize
the average charter share to equal one in 2004-05
12teracted with average charter share and then demeaned within individuals.
Table 3 shows the rst-stage results for the 2SLS estimates. In both samples the
instruments are statistically signicant at the 5% level. The joint F-test shows the
instruments to be reasonably strong with an F-statistic of 16.2 for the test-score gain
regressions and 14.5 for the discipline and attendance regressions.
Dening Charter Penetration
In order to assess the impact of charter schools on non-charter students, one needs
to identify which charters are geographically close enough to aect the traditional
public school. The extent of concentration of charters nearby can be referred to as
\charter penetration." Early measures of charter penetration were similar to that
proposed by Hoxby (2001). Her measure was whether a school district has over 6%
of enrollment in charter schools. But this does not inform us about school level
penetration, nor does it necessarily apply to locations other than Michigan where her
analysis had been conducted.
There are two issues to consider when measuring charter penetration at the school
level. The rst is, for a given geographic area, what is the proper measure of charter
penetration? Previous work has used the number of charters near a traditional public
school and the share of total enrollment in charter schools (Booker et al. 2008, Bifulco
and Ladd 2006, Sass 2006, Holmes, DeSimone and Rupp 2003). I use a modica-
tion of the second measure which uses enrollment only in the grades covered by the
regular public school. I believe this measurement best re
ects the pressures that
non-charter schools face from charter schools. Thus, I dene charter penetration
as follows. Dene a set of schools within a distance (d) of school j, including j
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where Gmin and Gmax are the lowest and highest grades, respectively for school j
and Enrollgnt is enrollment in grade g, school l and year t. For example, suppose I
am measuring charter penetration within one mile of a school, j, that serves grades
kindergarten through ve. In this case, for the denominator I calculate the total
13number of students attending schools within one mile (including those in j) who are
in grades kindergarten through ve. For the numerator, I do the same calculation,
but limit only to state charter schools. Thus, my charter penetration measure is the
fraction of all public school and charter school students in overlapping grades who
attend a state charter school within a geographic radius around the public school.19
The second issue is how wide of a geographic area denes a school's \market area"
within which it is subject to competitive pressures from charters. A necessary condi-
tion for this pressure to exist is that there is the potential for charters to draw students
away from regular public schools. While I cannot directly test this potential, I can
investigate whether increases in charter enrollment are associated with reductions in
enrollment in nearby regular public schools. Table 4 shows results that try to answer
this question by running regressions of the form
(10) Enrolljt =  + ChartEnroll
d
jt + Xjt	 + jt
where Enrolljt is enrollment in a regular public school j at time t, ChartEnrolld
jt is
total enrollment in state charter schools within d miles of the regular public school
and X includes year eects and/or school xed-eects depending on the specication.
When school and year xed eects are added, a clear pattern emerges. The results
suggest that an increase in charter enrollment within one mile of 100 students is
associated with a loss of twelve students from the local public school. As expected, this
number drops when we look at one to two miles, but remains statistically signicant
at seven students per 100 charter seats. However, for charters opening between two
and three miles, there is no statistically signicant relationship with regular public
school enrollment.20 This suggests that in LUSD, any regular public school would
likely only be aected by charters which open within two miles of their boundaries.
Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I focus my attention on schools where charters
open within relatively short distances. In particular I use 1.5 miles from the regular
public schools as distance measures. Baseline estimates using a one mile and a two-
mile radius were similar to the 1.5 mile estimates and are available in appendix table
2.21
19I exclude from this measure ve residential treatment facilities for substance abusers or juvenile
detention centers since enrollment in these is not voluntary. I also exclude one internet based charter
and one school that helps adults with credit repair.
20Regressions using years 1993 - 2004 and 1998 - 2004 provide qualitatively similar results
21Previous papers which look at charter impacts on non-charter schools use considerably varying
distances. Bifulco and Ladd (2006) and Sass (2006) use 2.5, 5, and 10 miles, while Holmes, Desimone,
and Rupp (2003) use distances ranging from 5 to 20 kilometers (3.1 to 12.4 miles) and also use the
county as the local education market. These longer distances are more appropriate in the context of
146 Results
Test Scores
Table 5 provides the main set of estimates for this paper. All regressions include
student xed-eects. In addition, the regressions also control for free lunch eligibility,
reduced price lunch eligibility, whether the student has another economic disadvan-
tage, whether the student is a recent immigrant, whether the student's parents are
migrant workers, and grade-by-year indicator variables.22 The estimates shown here
can be interpreted as a ten percentage point increase in charter share changing out-
comes by the coecient divided by ten.
Panel A shows the estimates for Stanford 9/10 gains. In column (1) I provide OLS
estimates without school xed-eects. All three exam subjects - math, reading, and
language - show no statistically signicant eect of charter penetration. Column (2)
adds school dummies to account for school xed-eects. This is the type of model that
has been commonly used in the previous literature. As such, the results are broadly
consistent with what has been found in those papers. For reading there is a small but
statistically signicant increase in test-score gains of 0.02 standard deviations for a 10
percentage point increase in charter share. Math and language estimates have similar
magnitudes but math is statistically insignicant and language is only statistically
signicant at the 10% level.
Column (3) provides the key results for this paper. In this column I provide esti-
mates from two-stage least squares regressions that utilize the number of properties
within 1.5 miles of at traditional public school that have 20,000 to 50,000 s.f. of
building space and the number of shopping centers within 1.5 miles as instruments
for charter share.23 In this model the results change considerably from the xed-
eects estimates. Both math and language scores show statistically signicant drops
in test-score gains. For math, the drop is 0.07 standard deviations for a 10 percentage
point increase in charter share while for language it's 0.06 standard deviations. The
impact on reading scores is essentially zero. This means that if a school increases
from no charter penetration within 1.5 miles to the 2004 average of 4% then math
and language gains will drop by 0.03 and 0.02 standard deviations, respectively. This
is a relatively modest drop, but nonetheless diers substantially from the positive
these papers, since their data include many suburban and rural areas where school attendance zones
are larger. However, my results do suggest that the proper distance should vary with urbanicity.
22See appendix table 1 for denitions of these variables.
23All 2SLS regressions in table 5 pass a Sargon-Hansen over-identication test at all standard
levels of signicance.
15estimate garnered from the regressions with school xed eects. Thus, overall, the
instrumental variable estimates suggest that charter schools have a modest negative
impact on test score gains in regular public schools.
Behavior
In panel B of table 5 we turn our attention to discipline and attendance impacts.
The discipline measure I use is the number of times a student is given an in-school
suspension or more severe punishment over the course of the year. These two mea-
sures are important potential indicators of non-cognitive skill formation. A potential
problem, however, is that disciplinary infractions is a measure of both outcomes and
enforcement. Thus, Imberman (2008) argues that while impacts on disciplinary infrac-
tions alone may not indicate improved behavior, if it is concurrent with improvements
in attendance than we can interpret the results as improvements in behavior due to
non-cognitive skill formation.
In OLS estimates with student xed-eects but no school xed-eects show es-
sentially no impact on disciplinary infractions and a signicant drop in attendance
rates. When we add school xed eects in column (2) both estimates increase and are
statistically insignicant. In column (3) the two-stage least squares estimates show a
signicant improvement in discipline. A 10 percentage point increase in charter share
reduces disciplinary infractions by 0.45 per student. While this may seem particularly
large, later on we will see that the impact is almost all in middle and high school
grades where average number of infractions is considerably higher than the district
overall. Nonetheless there is no corresponding improvement in attendance. Estimates
for attendance rates are close to zero and statistically insignicant. Thus, since the
attendance rate does not improve along with the disciplinary infractions, it is possible
that the discipline improvement is purely a change in enforcement.
Specication Checks
In table 6, I provide some specication checks to test potential concerns with
the 2SLS results. One concern is that the shopping centers instrument is driving
the estimates. This variable is more likely to be correlated with economic conditions
then the building size variable and also likely in
uences fewer charter school deci-
sions, thus pinpointing much of the variation on a handful of schools. However, it is
useful to include this variable as it improves the precision over using the building size
instrument on its own. Thus, in column (1) I provide estimates from regressions that
16use only properties with 20,000 to 50,000 square feet of building space as an instru-
ment. The results are similar to the baseline estimates with signicant drops in math
and language scores. The estimate on disciplinary infractions drops o somewhat
but remains statistically signicant at the 10% level. Despite these results, we may
still be concerned that the instruments are correlated with dierences in economic
conditions. Thus, in column (2) I include a series of controls for characteristics of
each schools' census tract as of the 2000 census. The controls include the fraction of
residents who are black, Hispanic, born in another country, have a high-school degree
or some college, and have a college degree. I also include the labor force participa-
tion rate for males 25 years or older and the log of average annual household income
along with dummy variables for which of LUSD's six regional districts - north, south,
central, east, west, and alternative - that the school is in. These estimates are nearly
unchanged from the main estimates in table 5. In column (3) II address the possibility
that the instruments may be picking up the eects of urbanization. To check this, I
control for a quadratic in the total number of commercial properties within 1.5 miles.
Almost all properties with 20,000 - 50,000 square feet of building space are commer-
cial. While the estimates shift towards zero, math and discipline are still statistically
signicant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, and language is signicant at the
10% level. Reading and attendance remain statistically insignicant. Thus, the 2SLS
estimates are robust to the specication checks.
6.1 Heterogeneity by Grade, Race, and Gender
In table 7, I look at what happens to the test score estimates when the sample
is split by grade, gender and race. Columns (1) and (2) consider how the estimates
vary by grade. Most of the impacts seem to occur in older children. In column (1) I
provide results for elementary students (grades 1 - 5). The test score estimates are
imprecise but they do show an impact that ranges from zero to negative. Reading
is the most hard hit subject at -0.08 standard deviations for a 10 percentage point
increase in charter share, however it is only signicant at the 10% level. Discipline and
attendance for elementary students also seems to be generally unaected. For middle
and high-school students, shown in column (2) I nd drops in math and language
scores, where math is signicant at the 10% level and language at the 5% level. At
the same time, however, discipline improves substantially amongst middle and high
students. The estimate of -5.8 implies that going from no charter penetration to the
2004-05 average of 4% reduces disciplinary infractions by 0.2 per student. This is
17approximately 30% of the average infraction rate amongst these grades. Columns
(3) and (4) look at dierences by gender. Both boys and girls have reductions in
disciplinary infractions and drops in test-score gains. However, girls have larger drops
in test scores than boys. The impact on math gains for girls is statistically signicant
and indicates a 0.14 standard deviation drop for a 10 percentage point increase in
charter share. Boys show no statistically signicant impact. For language, however,
both genders show statistically signicant drops in gains, but the reduction for girls
is somewhat larger at 0.08 standard deviations for every 10 percentage point increase
in charter share while for boys the drop is 0.05 standard deviations.
Finally, in columns (5) - (7) I separate the sample by race. Blacks appear to
fare poorly on test scores as they suer drops of 0.10 standard deviations and 0.14
standard deviations for math and language respectively with a 10 percentage point
increase in charter share. However, their disciplinary infractions also drop more than
hispanics or whites. For Hispanics the results are mixed. While there is a statistically
signicant drop in math gains, there is also a statistically signicant improvement for
reading as well as a drop in disciplinary infractions. For whites, the sample sizes are
smaller so the estimates are generally too imprecise to draw clear conclusions.
7 Conclusion
Charter schools have the potential to generate strong incentives for public school
administrators and teachers to increase eort and improve student performance. In
particular, charter advocates argue that traditional public schools will work harder
to prevent students from leaving so as to avoid losing funding and enrollment. In
addition, charters could also improve student outcomes by serving as \release valves"
for overcrowded schools or by changing peer composition. On the other hand, charters
could also lead to worsening student outcomes if traditional public schools cannot
adjust easily to funding losses, charters change peer groups in a negative way, or
charters hire good teachers from the public schools.
Using data from a large urban school district in the southwest (LUSD-SW) I
analyze how charter schools aect students in traditional public schools using an in-
strumental variables strategy to address potentially endogenous charter location and
student xed-eects to address endogenous movement of students across schools. My
instruments utilize constraints on charter location choices determined by the avail-
ability of appropriate locations to house a school. I argue that charters in LUSD need
to locate in properties that have enough building space house the school. However,
18properties that are very large are generally undesirable locations for charters such as
oce buildings, warehouses and apartment complexes. Thus, I utilize as an instru-
ment the number of properties with 20,000 to 50,000 square feet of building space
within 1.5 miles, which closely corresponds to the inter-quartile range of building
space for properties housing charters in LUSD in 2004. In addition, 16% of charters
in LUSD as of 2004 locate in current or former shopping centers. These structures
are often ideal locations for charters since they are easy to rent, are usually on main
roads, and provide space that can easily be modied. Thus I also use as an instru-
ment, the number of shopping centers within 1.5 miles of a regular public school.
Both of these instruments are interacted with average charter share, which is the
share of students in overlapping grades within 1.5 miles of a traditional public school
who attend charters, for the district in each year in order to add temporal variation.
I nd evidence that charter schools have a deleterious impact on math and lan-
guage test score gains in traditional public schools. Average math score gains fall by
0.07 standard deviations for a 10 percentage point increase in charter share , while lan-
guage gains fall by 0.06 standard deviations. Reading scores appear to be unaected
by charter penetration on average. These results dier from the previous literature
which generally nds either positive or statistically insignicant impacts of charter
penetration on regular public schools. Indeed, I conduct analyses using school-xed
eects and nd results for LUSD that are consistent with the prior literature.
While I cannot be sure what mechanisms drive these results, as the analysis is
reduced-form in nature, there are a few possibilities. One is that the schools lose
substantial funding in LUSD from a loss of a student to a charter that they are not
able to recover from in the short-term. These losses can be substantial. For LUSD
prior to 2002, if a student with no special categories leaves the district they lose
revenue equal to 67% of average expenditures per-student. After 2002 this is reduced
to 46% which is still a large amount. A second possibility is that charters change the
peers students face in the non-charter schools by attracting specic types of students.
Since I do not have individual data on the state charter schools I cannot be sure to
what extent the students dier. However, summary statistics using school level data
suggest that charters attract students who are socio-economically better o than non-
charter students on average, although they have lower test scores. A third possibility
may be that charters attract high-quality teachers from the regular public schools and
the need to cut costs, potentially through reducing sta, can impact teacher morale.
In addition to test scores, I look at disciplinary infractions - measured by the
number of in-school suspensions or more severe punishments a student incurs over
19the course of an academic year - and attendance rates. Imberman (2008) argues,
based on evidence from Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) that these measures to-
gether can serve as a proxy for non-cognitive skill formation while test scores measure
cognitive skill formation. However, because discipline is a measure of both behavior
and enforcement, any impacts in this measure need to also show up in attendance to
have condence that there are real behavioral changes. I nd that there are statis-
tically signicant drops in disciplinary infractions of 0.45 instances per student with
an increase in charter share of 10 percentage points. However, I nd no evidence
of improvement for attendance. Thus, the large improvement in discipline combined
with the drop in test scores and lack of improvement in attendance suggest that a
likely explanation is that the discipline results are due to changes in enforcement
in response to charter competition, though real behavioral improvements cannot be
ruled out.
When interpreting these estimates, though, one must realize the limitations of
this analysis. First of all, since I am looking within a single, albeit very large, school
district, the treatment eects are for highly localized insertions of charter schools.
Thus, this analysis does not consider what happens to the district overall as charter
programs grow. In fact, one could potentially have a situation where while charters
may be detrimental to individual schools close by, they could improve outcomes in a
school district as a whole. Second, LUSD is somewhat unique in the sense that there
already exist substantial choice options for students. The district has a wide range
of magnet programs and it's own charter program. There is also a large number of
private schools in LUSD. Hence, whereas the marginal benet from additional choice
in LUSD may be small, it could be substantially larger in other urban school districts.
Finally, due to the limitations of my instruments, I only consider short-term impacts
of charters and thus, over the long-term, charters could be more benecial.
Nonetheless, these results do show that charters can generate detrimental impacts
in regular public schools. Thus it is important for policy makers and researchers to
watch charter programs so that we can determine whether they're having the desired
eect on regular public schools and to modify such programs if the impacts become
undesirable.
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State Charter District CharterFigure 3A - Bias of School Fixed-Effects from Selection Of Charter Location Based 
on Temporary Trends 
Charter Opens
"Pre" Mean
The single solid line shows what happens to the outcome after the charter opens after removing school fixed effect.  The double solid line is the 
outcome path taken had no charter opened.   
No Charter "Post" Mean




tFigure 3B- Bias of School Fixed-Effects from Selection Of Charter Location Based 
on Permanent Trends 
Charter Opens
"Pre" Mean
The single solid line shows what happens to the outcome after the charter opens after removing school fixed effect.  The double solid line is the 
outcome path taken had no charter opened.   
No Charter "Post" Mean






























Observations are school level aggregates in each year.  Standard deviations are provided in 
parentheses.  Results are weighted by enrollment. **, *, and # denote that a t-test of the difference 
in weighted means  between charter and non-charter schools is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
Table 1 - Charter and Non-Charter Student Characteristics, 1998 - 2004
Hispanic
African-American, non-Hispanic
† A student is economically disadvantaged if he or she satistfies one of the following conditions: (1) 
is eligible to receive free or reduced price lunch, (2) has family income at or below the Federal 
poverty line, (3) is eligible for TANF or other public assistance, (4) is eligible for programs under 
Title II of the Job-Training Partnership Act, (5) is eligible for food stamps, or (6) receives a Federal 
Pell Grant.
 % Passing State Exams at 2004 Level




GiftedPercentiles of Charter Penetration 0 - 64 65- 74 75 - 89 90 - 99
Range of Charter Penetration Rates 0.0% -1.3% 1.3% - 4.5% 4.5% - 10.8% 10.8% - 39.7%
0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49
(0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
0.09 0.06 0.06* 0.10
(0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16)
0.37 0.33 0.36 0.36
(0.32) (0.33) (0.30) (0.29)
0.52 0.59 0.56 0.51
(0.32) (0.33) (0.30) (0.30)
0.65 0.71* 0.73*** 0.62
(0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26)
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.58 0.61* 0.66*** 0.64*
(0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23)
0.25 0.28 0.33*** 0.30
(0.21) (0.21) (0.25) (0.27)
0.10 0.06*** 0.07** 0.12
(0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.20)
0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
0.11 0.12 0.14** 0.15**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14)
Observations 1131 282 282 188
Charter penetration is defined the fraction of students who attend schools within 1.5 miles of and are in grades covered by the 
school being observed who attend state charters.  Standard deviations shown in parentheses.  **, *, and # denote that the mean is 
stastistically significantly different from column one using standard errors clustered by school at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Covers 1998 - 2004 only, so that only years with a large number of charter schools are considered.  Each 









Table 2A - Demographic Characteristics of LUSD Schools by Non-District Charter Penetration
Female
White, non-Hispanic
Gifted & TalentedPercentiles of Charter Penetration 0 - 64 65- 74 75 - 89 90 - 99
Range of Charter Penetration Rates 0.0% -1.3% 1.3% - 4.5% 4.5% - 10.8% 10.8% - 39.7%
-0.07 -0.12 -0.13 -0.07
(0.46) (0.41) (0.36) (0.47)
-0.07 -0.16 -0.16* -0.08
(0.48) (0.44) (0.37) (0.50)
-0.07 -0.15 -0.16* -0.09
(0.47) (0.42) (0.36) (0.49)
0.36 0.30 0.33 0.39
(0.59) (0.51) (0.53) (0.55)
94.37 94.87 94.84 93.37
(5.85) (5.23) (4.79) (6.87)
Observations 1131 282 282 188
Charter penetration is defined the fraction of students who attend schools within 1.5 miles of and are in 
grades covered by the school being observed who attend state charters.  Standard deviations shown in 
parentheses.  All test scores are measured as standard deviations from the mean scale score.  **, *, and # 
denote that the mean is stastistically significantly different from column one using standard errors clustered 
by school at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Covers 1998 - 2004 only, so that only years with a 
large number of charter schools are considered.  Each observation is the school-year mean.
Table 2B - Outcomes for LUSD Schools by Non-District Charter Penetration
Stanford 9/10 - Math
# of Disciplinary Infractions
Attendance Rate (%)
Stanford 9/10 - Reading





Charter Share in Overlapping 
Grades within 1.5 Miles
Charter penetration measure is share of enrollment in overlapping grades within specified distance. Test score regressions have 583,091 observations covering grades 2 - 11 in 1999 - 
2004.  Discipline & attendance regressions have 2,049,076 observations covering grades 1 - 12 in 1993 - 2004.  All regressions are demeaned within individuals to remove student fixed 
effects and include free or reduced price lunch status, other economic disadvantages, parents' migrant status, and grade*year dummies as covariates.  Huber/White standard errors 
clustered by school in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
16.2
14.5
Table 3 - 2SLS First Stage Estimates
I. Test Score Gain Regressions
F-Test of joint significance of 
excluded instruments
(average charter share)*
(# of shopping centers or strip 
malls in 1995)
Charter Share in Overlapping 
Grades within 1.5 Miles
(average charter share)*
(# properties with 20k - 50k s.f. of 
building space in 1995)







Observations 2484 2484 2484
Year Fixed Effects NYY
School Fixed Effects NNY
Dependent variable is total school enrollment.  Observations are school-year aggregates.  Regressions contain no covariates except those specified.  
Robust standard errors clustered by school are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 4: Relationship Between Charter Penetration and School Enrollment (1996 - 2004)
   2 - 3 Miles
   1 - 2 Miles













Observations 2,049,076 2,049,076 2,049,076
Student Fixed Effects Y Y Y
School Fixed Effects N Y N
Table 5: Estimates of Charter School Impacts on Traditonal Public School Students
A. Stanford 9/10 Gains (standard deviation units)
B. Behavior Measures
Charter penetration measure is share of enrollment in overlapping grades within 1.5 miles  All regressions include free or reduced price lunch status, 
other economic disadvantages, recent immigration status, parents' migrant status, and grade*year dummies as covariates.  Each regression is also 
demeaned within individuals to remove student fixed-effects.  Huber/White standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  **, *, and # denote 

















Observations 2,049,076 2,049,076 2,049,076
Table 6: Specification Checks
A. Stanford 9/10 Gains (standard deviation units)
B. Behavior Measures
2SLS - Control for # of 
Commercial Properties
2SLS - City Region & 
Economic Controls




Charter penetration measure is share of enrollment in overlapping grades within 1.5 miles  All regressions include free or reduced price lunch status, 
other economic disadvantages, recent immigration status, parents' migrant status, and grade*year dummies as covariates.  Each regression is also 
demeaned within individuals to remove student fixed-effects.   Huber/White standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  **, *, and # denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Math
Reading
Language(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.013 -0.579* -0.392 -1.429*** -0.987** -0.694** -1.633
(0.566) (0.333) (0.291) (0.515) (0.500) (0.323) (1.133)
-0.775* -0.013 0.281 -0.373 -0.446 0.516** -0.343
(0.456) (0.191) (0.253) (0.272) (0.352) (0.250) (0.740)
-0.286 -0.469** -0.511** -0.823** -1.426*** -0.034 0.302
(0.550) (0.199) (0.242) (0.330) (0.436) (0.178) (0.736)
Observations 234,492 348,665 292,024 291,067 210,301 285,108 66,770
0.330 -5.797*** -6.178*** -4.855*** -7.099** -3.701*** -2.054
(0.622) (1.533) (1.861) (1.441) (3.257) (1.346) (1.788)
-5.647 1.610 3.858 -2.981 4.430 3.431 9.200
(3.590) (8.531) (9.814) (9.497) (16.323) (7.614) (15.099)
Observations 1,003,075 1,046,001 1,041,310 1,007,766 679,650 1,089,537 219,191
Charter penetration measure is share of enrollment in overlapping grades within 1.5 miles    Elementary includes all students in grades 1 - 5 and middle\high includes all 
students in grades 6 - 12.  All regressions include free or reduced price lunch status, other economic disadvantages, recent immigration status, parents' migrant status, and 
grade*year dummies as covariates.  Each regression is also demeaned within individuals to remove student fixed-effects.   Huber/White standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses.  **, *, and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Elementary Milddle/High
Table 7: 2SLS Estimates of Charter School Impacts on Traditonal Public School Students - By Grade, Race & Gender
A. Stanford 9/10 Gains (standard deviation units)








ReadingStudent Level Variables Definition
At risk At risk classification varies by grade:
K - 3: Student fails a state reading exam or is LEP.
4 - 12: Student fails any section of state exam on most recent attempt, is LEP, or is overrage for 
grade.
A student is also classified "at-risk" if he/she is pregnant, abused, a parent, homeless, has previously 
dropped out, resides in a residential placement facility, attends an alternative education program, is 
diti l l f j il ti h i l b ll d
Attendance rate Percent of days the student is enrolled during which the student attends class.
Free lunch  Whether student is eligible for free lunches under the Federal free-lunch program.
Gifted and talented Student is enrolled in a gifted and talented program.
Infractions Number of disciplinary infractions a student has during a given year warranting a punishment of one 
day suspension or higher.
Limited English proficient (LEP) A student is categorized as LEP if (a) he or she speaks a language other than english at home and (b) 
scores below English proficiency level on a oral language proficiency test or scores below the 40th 
percentile in total reading and language on standardized tests
Other economic disadvantage  Student is designated as having another economic disadvantage if the student does not qualify for 
free or reduced-price luncha and one of the following conditions hold:
(1) family income is below Federal poverty line
(2) is eligible for public assistance (i.e. TANF, Food Stamps, etc.)
(3) family received a Pell Grant or comparable form of state financial aid
(4) eligible for training under Title II of the Job Training Partnership Act
Parents are migrants Student meets the following conditions for eligibility for the Migrant Education Program (MEP):
(1) aged 3 - 21
(2) has a parent, guardian, or spouse who is a migratory agricultural or fishing worker
(3) has moved between school districts withing 3 years for said parent, guardian, or spouse to seek 
temporary or seasonal work in agriculature or fishing
Recent immigrant (within 3 years) Student is aged 3 - 21, was born outside the US, and has not been enrolled in a US school for more 
than 3 years (based on eligibility requirements of the Emergency Immigrant Education Program 
(EIEP) of 1994.
Reduced price lunch  Whether student is eligible for reduced price lunches under the Federal free-lunch program.
Special education Student is eligible for special education services.
Stanford 9/10 Math, Reading, and Language Score on Stanford Achievement Test vertsions 9 and 10 in math, reading or language  Measured in 
standard deviations of scale scores.
Census Tract Variables Definition
Population Density Population count of Census tract divided by land area of tract.  In miles.
Fraction Black Fraction of people in Census tract who are black.
Fraction Hispanic Fraction of people in Census tract who are Hispanic.
Fraction Non-Native Fraction of people in Census tract who were not born in the United States.
Fraction w/ HS or Some College Fraction of people in Census tract who graduated high school but did not complete a 4-year college 
degree.
Fraction w/ College or Advanced Degree Fraction of people in Census tract who completed a 4-year college degree.
Labor Force Participation Fraction of males aged 16+ in Census tract who are in the labor force.
Ln (Household Income) Natural logarithm of median household income in Census tract.
Fraction receiving Public Assistance Fraction of people in Census tract who receive money from a Federal, state, or local anti-poverty 
program.
Table A1 - Description of Data Elements Used in Analysis(1) (2)













Appendix Table 2: 2SLS Estimates of Charter Share on 
Traditonal Public School Students - 1 and 2 Mile Radii
Charter penetration measure is share of enrollment in overlapping grades within 1.5 miles  All 
regressions include free or reduced price lunch status, other economic disadvantages, recent 
immigration status, parents' migrant status, and grade*year dummies as covariates.  Each 
regression is also demeaned within individuals to remove student fixed-effects.  Huber/White 
standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  **, *, and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
A. Stanford 9/10 Gains (standard deviation units)
B. Behavior Measures
Reading
Language
# Disciplinary Infractions
Attendance
Math